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SUMMARY
In Japan, the Court often examines the technical aspects of administrative discretion if there was 
a proper decision-making process. Such control could rely too much upon each judges’ viewpoint, 
which elements in the whole process of administrative discretion have critical gravity to evaluate 
(kōryo kachi). The pre-war legal scholars suggested the best way to increase judicial protection on 
the citizens’ rights endangered by administrative discretion. The need to establish robust legal theory 
based on it the Court guarantees the balance between smooth enactment of administrative measures 
and maintenance of social justice is still enormous. Administrative guidance was, for a long time, 
out of the scope of judicial control. This institution is Japan’s original so that its implication well 
exceeds the standard understanding of mere instruction in other legal cultures. The Japanese Court 
acknowledges the existence of “forced consent” behind it more frequently in recent years.
Keywords: axiology; administrative discretion; administrative guidance; administrative law; 
administrative litigation; Japanese law; German law; Tatsukichi Minobe; Minamata disease; lawsuits 
against nuclear power plant; the Oil Cartel Case; ripeness doctrine
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INTRODUCTION
The author’s concern lies in the matter of judicial control over administration 
in Japan. According to J. Tanaka, there was an extensive discussion in Germany in 
the early 1920s to what extent the Administrative Court can intervene in adminis-
trative discretion if the officers adequately executed the delegated power1. Since 
the pre-war Japanese legal scholars were under the dominant influence of German 
administrative law, they conducted an academic analysis of administrative discre-
tion intensively. The Japanese judiciary hesitates to acknowledge the unlawfulness 
of administrative discretion. In the article, the author analyzes the background both 
from the representative court rulings and legal theories.
The second issue which the author discusses in this paper is the problem of 
administrative guidance. This administrative measure occupies a specific position 
in the Japanese administration in practice. As L. Leszczyński pointed out, the Japa- 
nese word assigned for it, gyōsei shidō implies something advised or instructed 
fallen from the top to bottom following a given hierarchy. This dependency plays 
a critical role in understanding this institution in the background of the social culture 
of Japan. So that the terminology cannot be translated as “pure” hint, remarks or 
request suggested horizontally in a given organization2. The author applies a similar 
research framework, as in the case of administrative discretion.
THE ORIGIN OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND ITS RECEPTION 
BY THE JAPANESE LEGAL SCHOLARS
The Japanese legal theory on administrative discretion (gyōsei sairyō) much 
owes to the Austrian and German judiciary. According to Tanaka, the first law which 
defined the question of administrative discretion was Article 3 of the Austrian Law 
on Establishing Single Administrative Court (Gesetz betreffend die Einrichtung 
eines Verwaltungsgerichtshofes) promulgated on 22 October 1875. The law pre-
cluded the matters in which administrative authorities are entitled to act at their 
discretion from the administrative court proceedings.
Following to Austria, the southern German states set up independent admin-
istrative courts but excluding the discretion issues (Ermessensklausel) from the 
catalog to be adjudicated by the courts. In principle, the scope of the Austrian ju-
dicial control over administration was limited to the legal matters (Rechtsfragen). 
1 J. Tanaka, Gyōsei sōshō no hōri, Tokyo 1954, pp. 205–262. The original academic paper of 
Tanaka was published in 1931 in “Kokka Gakkai Zassshi”, Vol. 45(3–4).
2 L. Leszczyński, Gyoseishido w japońskiej kulturze prawnej, Lublin 1996, p. 81.
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The discretion matters (Ermessensfragen) were put outside of the subject heard 
by the Court.
In the original text of the above-mentioned Austrian law, we see an expression 
of “free discretion” (freies Ermessen). In the classical legal theory, there was a di-
vision between “bounded measures” (gebundenes Ermessen / kisoku sairyō) and 
“free measures” (jiyū sairyō). The former appears when administrators implement 
the law mechanically, according to his highest knowledge and conscience (nach 
seinem höchsten Wissen und Gewissen). Thus, the “bounded measures” are the 
subject of judicial control, and the Court determines if the official employed the 
law correctly.
On the other hand, the law does not give any outline to be followed by the ad-
ministrators in the latter case. Therefore, the administrators enjoy the freedom to 
make an appropriate choice within the scope of entitled power to him, considering 
its feasibility/appropriateness (Zweckmäßigkeit) or fairness (billig) in it. According 
to classical theory, “free discretion” was excluded from the jurisdiction of the Ad-
ministrative Court3. The issue is that there is a thin wall between the two concepts, 
and sometimes it is hard to judge which group a given measure belongs.
The pre-war Japanese legal scholars tried to solve this question by breaking 
down the whole process of administrative measures into several stages. At the 
same time, by doing so, they scrutinized the possibility of judicial review over the 
administrators’ discretionary actions conducted in the scope of delegated authority 
(“free discretion”). According to H. Shiono, there are following five steps in the 
administrative measures:
A. recognizing the facts/fact-findings,
B. evaluating the factual status if it fulfills the obligatory conditions required 
by the law (conducting the official’s discretion in exploring conformity with 
the legal requirements: yōken sairyō or “discretion in prerequisites”),
C. selecting appropriate proceedings,
D. choosing the right measure among available options (kōka sairyō or “dis-
cretion in the results”), and
E. setting up a deadline by when the administrator conducts the above means 
(toki no sairyō or “discretion on timing”).
S. Sasaki (1878–1965) advocated that in the administrative disputes, the Court 
can question the legality of the administration’s activities from stage B of the 
above five phases. In Sasaki’s understanding, the judiciary holds a broad range 
of intervention in the discretion matters. According to him, in phase B mentioned 
above, if the provisions of the applicable law stipulate the way of executing the 
administrator’s discretion in a general manner, the actions taken by the official 
are bound by law (thus, the Court can decide its legality). Sasaki provided such 
3 J. Tanaka, op. cit., pp. 207–225.
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an example from the legal texts as “corrupting good morals” (zenryō na fūzoku 
o gaisuru). Referring to German, Sasaki called these provisions as “undefined legal 
concepts” (Unbestimmter Rechtsbegriff).
On the contrary, the administration can perform full discretion in the time when 
the applicable law only gives the ultimate, ambiguous purpose (shūkyoku mokuteki) 
of it. A clause in an act such as “for the public interest” falls into this category. Not 
to say, as the law provides the authority with a complete delegation of authority 
(Blankovollmacht or carte blanche / freedom to act), the judiciary has no room to 
examine its legality, according to Sasaki. The boundary he drew was dependent on 
the wording of each legal text. If it was the rule of the game, the lawgivers could 
easily manipulate the range of the administration’s discretion potentially interfered 
with by the judiciary.
T. Minobe (1897–1948) paid attention to phase D from the viewpoint of the 
outcome of the administrative measures. He emphasized that the Court can control 
the official’s appropriateness in phase B, only if the administration infringes or 
constitutes a limitation on the right/freedom of citizens, or set up an obligation to 
them in phase D.
While in case the administration establishes a right or provides services/profits 
for citizens, the authority can act freely in phase B, according to him. In this case, 
the Court has no right to question the official’s discretion. As the administration 
does not set up any rights nor obligation for citizens by their decisions, it is free 
from judicial control from the discretionary viewpoints, according to Minobe4.
The pre-war Administrative Court, as a rule, rendered preferable rulings for the 
business permit issues, including requiring permission by the police, according to 
Tanaka’s detailed analysis of the court rulings. Minobe supported the concept that 
freedom of establishment cannot be restricted unless it put public order under at risk5.
THE POST-WAR COURT RULINGS ON ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION 
TILL THE PRESENT DAY
H. Itō, summarizing 30 years of post-war Supreme Court’s activity, mentioned 
that the Court granted the administration with a wide range of discretion, namely, as 
it contained highly technological or political aspects. Itō criticized that the post-war 
legal reform did not contribute to establishing a judiciary that actively determines 
the unconstitutionality (iken sei) of administrative measures or legal acts. He named 
4 H. Shiono, Gyōsei hō, Vol. 1, Tokyo 2015, pp. 139–141.
5 J. Tanaka, op. cit., pp. 288–298; T. Minobe, Gyōsei saiban hō, Tokyo 1929, p. 110.
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the Japanese Supreme Court as a court with self-control (jiko-yokusei gata no Saikō 
Saibansho) in comparison to its peer of the USA6.
According to H. Hashimoto, in the first decade after the war (1945–1955), the 
Supreme Court took a self-restrained stance in controlling the legality of the admin-
istration’s behaviours in the fact-finding phase. The Court found it to be affirmative 
to recognize any activity of the administration as unlawful only when the factual 
basis of the attacked decision was missing at all, or an erroneous interpretation in 
its assumptions was apparent.
In the 1950s, the Court set a standard to determine when it acknowledges an 
excess of the discretion. The Court said that the abuse of power qualifies as the 
administration exercised the discretionary power in a way being outstandingly not 
compliant with the social norms (shakai tsūnen jyō ichijirushiku datō o kaku sairyō 
ken kōshi). Hashimoto argues that these rigid criteria from the 1950s still bind the 
current Court’s rulings7.
According to H. Takagi, for decades, the judiciary took a position that it needs 
to find a “considerable” and “distinct” character in the misuse of the empowered 
authority to decide it as illegal. This considerable-and-distinct doctrine (jyūdai 
meihaku setsu) was an invention of professor, Tanaka, and it dominated the judi-
ciary for years8.
T. Fujita criticized that the Japanese courts have in mind to investigate the 
objective facts (kyakkanteki na jijitsu) so precisely and in detail as to an abnormal 
extent in the administrative litigations in comparison to the civil or criminal law 
cases. The Nagoya High Court, Branch in Kanazawa, found the defendant guilty 
in a case the victims of the mass cadmium poisoning (itai-itai disease) sued the 
polluter9. According to him, in the ruling cited above, the Court determined that 
soft evidence acquired from an epidemiological review was enough to establish 
the causation of the pollution. The Court did not require any pathological, rigid 
evidence findings in this case.
According to Merrian-Webster Dictionary, pathology is the study of the causes 
and effects of disease or injury. On the other hand, epidemiology is the study of 
the distribution (who, when, and where), patterns, and determinants of health and 
disease conditions in defined populations. The dictionary says that epidemiology 
shapes policy decisions and evidence-based practice by identifying risk factors 
for disease and targets for preventive healthcare10. Therefore, it is rational that the 
6 H. Itō, Iken rippō shinsa to jiko-yokusei gata no Saikō Saibansho, [in:] Soshō seido to shihō 
kyūsai, ed. H. Wada, Tokyo 1989, p. 61 and 77.
7 H. Hashimoto, Gyōsei hanrei to shikumi kaishaku, Tokyo 2009, p. 52.
8 H. Takagi, Gyōsei soshō ron, Tokyo 2005, p. 374.
9 Judgement of the Nagoya High Court (Branch in Kanazawa) of 9 August 1972, Hanrei jihō, 
No. 674, p. 25.
10 Epidemiology, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/epidemiology [access: 29.03.2020].
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Court did not demand the plaintiff to submit pathological data in the trial mentioned 
above, which in general much harder to obtain than those of epidemiological ones.
In a medical negligence lawsuit, the Supreme Court said that the evidence 
required in the court proceedings to establish legal liability was not necessarily 
the same as such required to the precise scientific verification processes. The pur-
pose of the scientific examination lay on the elimination of any single doubt (and 
it exceeds the Court’s requirements for justice)11. As well, in a criminal case, the 
Supreme Court determined that the recognition of guilt was available in a situation 
where a contradictional fact could exist solely in the abstract level of possibility. 
In the same ruling, the Court mentioned that it would also recognize guilt if there 
was no socially acceptable rational ground to recognize the plausibility of such an 
opposing fact12.
The highly specialized and technical discretion (kōdo no senmon gijyutsuteki 
sairyō) is a keyword upon which the Japanese judiciary was divided into two 
groups: one upheld the perception that the Court can review the legality of such 
discretion, and another renounced such a possibility. In the past, the Minamata dis-
ease, a neurological syndrome caused by severe mercury poisoning, deprived of the 
lives of many victims in a port town in southern Japan. In one lawsuit brought by 
a sufferer of the disease, the subject of dispute was the legality of an administrative 
decision rejecting the plaintiff to qualify him as the patient. As the ground of the 
unfavorable decision was the fact-findings submitted by a publicly appointed com-
mittee to provide a scientific investigation to identify the petitioner as a patient of 
the Minamata disease, the Supreme Court had to determine if the judiciary reviews 
the appropriateness of the experts’ opinion assumed to be objective.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower Court’s decision, which supported the 
competent committee’s rejection of the recognition for a petitioner as a patient of 
Minamata disease. The lower Court decided it as reasonable from the viewpoint 
that the committee’s decision-making path was compliant with the due process. On 
the contrary, the Supreme Court actively investigated the case from the view of the 
synergy between facts and evidence, or a flexible application of the yes-no tests in 
determining the causal relationship between a particular aspect of the syndrome 
and the contamination substance, and the like13.
In December 1956, a few months later from the first detection of the syndrome, 
Dr. Kitamura at Kumamoto Medical University figured out that the wastewater from 
a chemical plant is the resource of the fatal contamination of the sea. The polluter, 
nor the local administration did not reply to his warning. They both insisted that, 
11 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 24 October 1975, Minshū, Vol. 29, No. 9, p. 1417.
12 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 16 October 2007, Keishū, Vol. 61, No. 7, p. 677.
13 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 16 April 2013, Minshū, Vol. 67, No. 4, p. 1115; T. Fujita, 
Saiban to hōritsu gaku, Tokyo 2016, pp. 153–156.
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without specifying the mechanism of pathological consequences or defining a sub-
stance causing the illness, no liability should be imposed on the polluter.
Dr. M. Harada (1934–2012) claimed that the liability of the polluter is proven if 
the epidemiological diagnosis attests that the wastewater is attributable to the mass 
poisoning. He repeatedly warned that in public contamination cases, preventive 
actions are the most important to limit the damage to a minimum. It was a fact that 
the destruction process of the human brain neuron by the organic (methyl) mercury, 
the causal substance of the Minamata disease was unclear before Dr. Irukayama 
revealed it in 1963. The administration, as well as the polluter company, kept 
a stance that while no perfect, scientific proof for the causality of the disease was 
available, their responsibility should be none.
At last, in 1968, the Ministry of Health and Welfare declared that methyl mer-
cury abandoned by the polluter (Chisso Corporation) caused the Minamata disease. 
In the same year, following the closure of the polluter’s plant, finally, the contam-
ination was ceased. Meaningless 12 years had passed since the epidemiological 
causality of the pollution was disclosed in 195614.
The Minamata disease left a bitter lesson that the judiciary as the last resort 
of human rights protection cannot stay as a “feeble watch-dog” of the due process 
in the administrative procedures. The Court should act solidly in controlling the 
legality of the administration’s behaviour, in particular, as the violation of citizens’ 
rights is suspected.
According to Fujita, another case in which the administration’s highly special-
ized and technical discretion was the subject of dispute was the lawsuits demanding 
to annul the building permits for nuclear plants. The question was if the Court can 
judge better than the administration in the costs and benefits assessments of setting 
up a nuclear plant, deliberating the public interests and potential risks in a proper 
way. The Supreme Court mentioned that if the Court identifies outstanding errors or 
omissions in the Atomic Energy Commission’s judging, investigating or reviewing 
processes, it could cancel such a permit15. Fujita named it as “judgement process 
control” (handan katei no shinsa)16.
Article 30 of the Japanese Act of 16 May 1962 – Administrative Litigation 
Law (gyōsei jiken soshō hō: Law No. 139) says that the Court can revoke the ad-
ministrative discretion only when the Court finds excess or abuse of the delegated 
power in it. The “judgement process control” was one of the significant tools 
adopted by the Court to implement the above provision. According to Hashimoto, 
one of the first cases in which the Supreme Court employed this technique was the 
14 M. Harada, Minamata byō, Tokyo 1972, p. 29, 55, 69 and 108.
15 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 29 October 1992, Minshū, Vol. 46, No. 7, p. 1174 – Ikata 
Newclear Plant Case.
16 T. Fujita, op. cit., pp. 148–149.
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Nikkō Tarō Cedar Tree Case17. In this court dispute, the Court concluded that the 
defendants did not evaluate the essential aspects in planning a route for the new 
public road, i.e. the historical value of the monumental Tarō Cedar Tree and the 
required environmental protection of the surroundings. The Court pointed out that 
the defendant, a competent administrative office, commit a fatal mistake in exer-
cising the discretionary power. The Court assessed that the defendant deliberated 
non-qualified matters such as increasing car traffics in connection to the Tokyo 
Olympic Games in 1964, and so on.
On the contrary, in the Odakyū Railway Case, the Supreme Court dismissed 
the plaintiffs’ complaint asking to nullify the urban planning based on which an 
overhead railway of which hight was above the street level was constructed. The 
plaintiffs claimed that the competent office did not consider the results of the 
environmental assessment. They also condemned that there was significant neg-
ligence in the construction cost analysis to choose a plan between overhead and 
underground methods. The above-mentioned “judgement process control” (handan 
katei no shinsa) was the subject of the Court’s investigation. The Court ruled that 
there were no fatal omissions in the decision-making process to be scrutinized by 
the defendant18.
In the Rinshi no Mori Case, the competent agency treated an expropriation 
of the private land as a prerequisite in the urban planning to build a public park. 
The Supreme Court ordered the lower Court to re-examine the rationality of the 
expropriation in a situation where the administration chose such an option without 
assessing any other possible solutions19.
As Hashimoto summarized, the improvement in the judicial control over the 
proper exercise of the discretionary power is on the way. The Court promotes the 
review from the viewpoints of selection in the elements to be examined (kōryo 
yōso) or taking an analytical balance in weighting each of them (kōryo kachi) in 
handling the empowered power by the administration. Albeit, he expressed an 
anxious that this approach would owe much on each judge’s subjective screening 
on the process building in the discretion matters. According to Hashimoto, the ad 
hoc interpretation in the decision-making process would provoke an issue that the 
depth of the Court’s review could differ for each case. He suggests coming back to 
the traditional point of discussion, i.e. the study of the discretion’s legal effects in 
17 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 13 July 1973, Gyōshū, Vol. 24, No. 6–7, p. 533.
18 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 2 November 2006, Minshū, Vol. 60, No. 9, p. 3249. In the 
referred case (the Odakyū Railway Case), the Supreme Court judged it fair to put the urban planning 
under the judicial control, and it applied the “judgement process control” method in its decision 
(T. Hino, Toshi keikaku to sairyō shinsa, [in:] Gyōsei hanrei hyakusen, eds. K. Uga, N. Kōketsu, 
T. Yamamoto, Vol. 1, Tokyo 2017, pp. 152–153).
19 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 4 September 2006, Hanrei jihō, No. 1948, p. 26.
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the citizens’ rights, as well as deepening our understanding of the proportionality 
principle in the impact analysis of the discretionary power.
The Japanese Act of 9 June 2004 – Law on Administrative Litigation Law 
(Law No. 84) gave a new competence to the judges to request the administrative 
agency standing as a defendant to submit any source materials provided and used 
as the basis of issuing the attacked decisions. In this way, the burden of proof in the 
administrative litigations partially moved from the appellants to the administration 
(Article 23 (2) of the Act). We witness the opening of a new horizon in democra-
tizing the judiciary in this field.
ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE AND THE COURT RULINGS
Gyōsei shidō or administrative guidance, according to Shiono, was historically 
speaking not a legal terminology but used in the mass media or the legal practices. 
In practice, the administration expresses it as guidance (shidō), recommendations 
(kankoku), or advice (jyogen), but not limited to these descriptions. By giving it, 
the authority expects the addressee to act, or choose an option of inaction in line 
with its anticipations. According to the Japanese Act of 12 November 1993 – Law 
on Administrative Procedure (gyōsei tetsuzuki hō: Law No. 88), the administrative 
guidance does not consist a part of the legally effective administrative measures 
(gyōsei shobun) such as decisions (Article 2 (6) of the Act).
That being said, in Japan, the administrative guidance prevails on a broad scale. 
Shiono points out, in Japanese society, preference for the paternalistic approaches 
observed both in the administration-private person relationships or between the 
private persons. According to him, in Japan, the informality comes as the first 
choice than the formality. This socially accepted norm would be the most plausible 
explanation behind the paternalistic approaches mentioned above.
According to Shiono, in the modern society where an elastic reaction to the 
changing circumstances predominates, the informal means, not the formal means as 
the administrative legislation, administrative measures or administrative contracts 
would work rightly. By implementing the informal means, he insists, that the ad-
ministration can expect to form a smooth consensus among all parties involved20.
On the other hand, the dangerous feature of the administrative guidance exists 
when its addressees’ “voluntary accords” are, in fact, a disguise. According to 
H. Hashimoto and K. Sakurai, often it is the case that the recipients follow the 
guidance against their will in an unequal relationship with the administration backed 
by overwhelming authority21. Before the enactment of Law on Administrative Pro-
20 H. Shiono, op. cit., pp. 220–221.
21 H. Hashimoto, K. Sakurai, Gyōsei hō, Tokyo 2011, p. 140.
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cedure in 1993, the administration often refused to receive the applicant’s petition if 
he or she did not follow their suggestions over the office counter (madoguchi shidō).
The municipality office, out of the scope of the empowered authority, asked 
a developer to diminish the number of stories of the planned condominium ex-
pecting to avoid predictable disputes with the surrounding inhabitant as a preven-
tive measure. Followingly, the officer in charge “recommended” the petitioner to 
organize dialogues with a group of the neighboring dweller. Otherwise, he or she 
did not receive the application for the building permit. It was a typical depiction 
of showing what administrative guidance in practice was22. The Administrative 
Procedure Act resolved this issue, at least at the legislative level. In essence, the 
prohibition of further provision of the recommendation as the petitioner expresses 
his or her will not to follow it (Article 33), and the principle of commencing the 
review upon the arrival of the application (Article 7).
In the context of the post-war vibrant economic growth of Japan by the 1980s, 
the domestic and foreign scholars, including lawyers, political scientists, and econ-
omists, gave great attention to the administrative guidance. M.K. Young took note 
of various examples. The METI’s (Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry) at-
tempts to encourage mergers among car component makers in the 1960s, the same 
ministry’s recommendation aimed at some 80 steel producers to limit production 
and coordinate prices in 1965, or the same regulator’s impose on the car manufac-
turers to restrict car exports in the outbreak of a trade war between Japan and the 
USA in the early 1980s, and so forth. He mentioned as follows:
To assume voluntary compliance and substantial cooperation, agencies engage in practices de-
signed to increase the informal, generally unreviewable input of parties into the regulatory process. 
Indeed, agencies that engage in administrative guidance undertake extensive consultations with 
regulated parties – which may include industry representatives – about the need for regulation and 
the form it will take23.
For facilitating the dialogues, the ministerial officials set up numerous joint 
councils with the representatives of the particular industry, which will be affected 
by new regulations (such commissions are referred to as kyōgi kai or shingi kai).
In one of the extreme court cases, the METI requested to the Petroleum Fed-
eration, an industry trade association, to allocate specific production shares among 
its members without legal grounds. As well, the ministry officials intervened in the 
determination process of the consumer oil price among the members of the asso-
22 See the Shinagawa Condominium Case – judgement of the Supreme Court of 16 July 1985, 
Minshū, Vol. 39, No. 5, p. 989.
23 M.K. Young, Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally Encouraged 
Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan, “Columbia Law Review” 1984, Vol. 84(4), DOI: https://
doi.org/10.2307/1122384, pp. 926–927, 939, 947, 949.
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ciation. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no ground to declare administrative 
guidance in dispute as illegal. According to the Court, the aim of the guidance was 
pursuant to the ultimate purpose of the Anti-Trust Law, i.e. to ensure the general 
consumer interests, or to promote the democratic and robust development of the 
national economy. On the contrary, the Court determined that the illegality of the 
oil price cartel does not preclude even if it was formed on the ground of the ad-
ministrative guidance24.
In recent years, the number of court decisions determining that administrative 
guidance not pursuant to the law is increasing. In the Musashino Condominium 
Case, the Supreme Court decided that the rejection of the mayor of Musashino 
City to provide running water to the condominiums of which structures were not 
compliant with non-binding building instruction unlawful25. In the same city, the 
city council requested the developers to incur expenses for the public educational 
facilities. To some of the developers who did not follow the request, no running 
water was supplied as a sanction. The Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiffs su-
ing the city council have a right to put their case, that the city council is obliged 
to compensate their damages for abuse of power in the administrative guidance26.
The Supreme Court determined that the administrative guidance had a binding 
character in some cases. According to the Court, the Quarantine Office’s notice on 
the violation of the provision of the Food Safety Act brings a legal effect, since as 
a consequence, the importation of the relevant goods becomes impossible for the 
addressee of such notice27. As well, the Court ruled that the recommendations given 
based on the Medical Act possess a binding effect since the entities who do not fol-
low the administrative guidance “are robbed of the possibility to build hospitals”28.
There are lawsuits in which the court judges if an administrative plan (gyōsei 
keikaku) is binding. For many years, the Japanese courts dismissed plaintiffs’ pleas 
to claim urban planning (tochi kukaku seiri keikaku) unlawful. In one of the rulings, 
the Supreme Court called urban planning as a “blueprint” (ao jyashin), which does 
not bring any legal effects. The Court judged that the standing to sue for plaintiffs 
was not applicable since the subject of disputes is not riped enough to be heard by 
the Court29. The initial intention of Kenzō Shiraishi, a judge of the Tokyo Regional 
Court who suggested referring to the American ripeness doctrine (seijyuku-sei riron) 
was to make the mandatory court rulings available in the administrative litigation. 
24 The Oil Cartel Case – judgement of the Supreme Court of 24 February 1984, Keishū, Vol. 38, 
No. 4, p. 1287.
25 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 8 November 1989, Hanrei jihō, No. 1328, p. 16.
26 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 18 February 1993, Minshū, Vol. 47, No. 2, p. 574.
27 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 26 April 2004, Minshū, Vol. 58, No. 4, p. 989.
28 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 15 July 2005, Minshū, Vol. 59, No. 6, p. 1661; H. Hashimo-
to, K. Sakurai, op. cit., pp. 149–151.
29 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 23 February 1966, Minshū, Vol. 20, No. 2, p. 271.
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He had in mind that the ripeness test could be a criterion to judge if the judiciary 
can change the contents of the original administrative decisions30. In practice, as 
a result of preparing urban planning, the authority based on it, in the later stage, 
can issue an order for the landlords to move to another place. Therefore, there was 
a persistent doubt that urban planning, in reality, merely was equal to “blueprints”.
At a later date, the Supreme Court reversed the previous rulings. It said that the 
residential owners in the urban planning area have a position to receive a binding 
decision to move to substitutional land in the future. Therefore, the planning has 
a direct impact on the legal status of such owners, and their right is the subject to 
be adequately protected31.
As we have seen above, the Japanese courts have recognized that the admin-
istration could force the citizen to follow their will by imposing administrative 
guidance. The courts gradually expand their control over administrative guidance. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, the author scrutinized the issue of administrative discretion and 
administrative guidance in Japan, and researched legal transplantation of the ad-
ministrative discretion from the Western countries to Japan. An in-depth survey of 
the post-war court judgements followed.
On the other hand, the author did not conduct a full-scale analysis of the origin 
of administrative guidance. As K. Ōyama highlighted, the Japanese word of gyōsei 
shidō appeared and used as a legal term since the 1960s, during the time of Japan’s 
fast economic growth32. He mentioned that the controlled economy during wartime, 
as well as the post-war French mixed-economy, formed the backbone of adminis-
trative guidance initiated by the substantial lead of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, 
and Industry (METI) in the early 1960s33.
The better appreciation of this issue in the future would help the author to find 
an organic path-through between administrative guidance and court rulings.
Backing to the topic of administrative discretion, the author positively assessed 
that the Japanese judiciary step by step broadened the scope of its control. This paper 
may contain limitations here that the author fails to indicate the general direction 
of the Japanese courts on the discretionary issue: how they would develop a proper 
approach in this field. Further research would shed light on these questions.
30 N. Harada, Uttae no rieki, Tokyo 1973, pp. 70–71.
31 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 10 September 2008, Minshū, Vol. 62, No. 8, p. 2029.
32 K. Ōyama, Gyōsei shidō no seiji keizaigaku, Tokyo 1996, p. 7.
33 Ibidem, pp. 116–121.
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STRESZCZENIE
W Japonii sąd często bada techniczne aspekty dyskrecjonalności w administracji, o ile miał miej-
sce właściwy proces decyzyjny. Taka kontrola może w zbyt dużym stopniu opierać się na poglądach 
każdego z sędziów, a te elementy w całym procesie mają krytyczną wagę dla oceny (kōryo kachi). 
Przedwojenne szkoły prawnicze sugerowały najlepsze sposoby zwiększania ochrony sądowej praw 
obywatelskich zagrożonych przez dyskrecjonalność administracyjną. Potrzeba ustalenia solidnej 
teorii, na podstawie której sąd gwarantuje równowagę między łagodnym wprowadzeniem środków 
administracyjnych a utrzymaniem sprawiedliwości społecznej, jest nadal ogromna. Wytyczne admi-
nistracyjne przez długi czas znajdowały się poza zakresem kontroli sądowej. Instytucja wytycznych 
w Japonii ma oryginalny charakter, więc jej implikacje znacznie przekraczają standardowe rozumienie 
zwykłych instrukcji w innych kulturach prawnych. Japoński sąd przyznaje, że istnienie „przymusowej 
zgody” na te instrukcje częściej stwierdza się w ostatnich latach.
Słowa kluczowe: aksjologia; dyskrecjonalność administracyjna; wytyczne administracyjne; prawo 
administracyjne; spory administracyjne; prawo japońskie; prawo niemieckie; Tatsukichi Minobe; cho-
roba Minamata; procesy sądowe przeciwko elektrowni jądrowej; sprawa kartelu naftowego; doktryna 
dojrzałości
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